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Disquieting news items have appeared in the media regarding Soviet actions that, if 
officially confirmed, would affect the implementation of the INF and CFE treaties, signed 
respectively in December of 1987 and November of 1990. All of the reports in question 
speak of the transfer by the Soviet Union of specific weapons systems either to other 
countries or from one part of the USSR to another, in apparent nonconformity with the 
spirit, if not the letter of these two agreements.
The INF Treaty
In the spring of 1990, several of the newly installed, post communist governments in 
Eastern Europe revealed that the USSR had transferred the Soviet OTR-23 (also known 
as the SS-23) shorter-range missiles to those countries despite the fact that Articles I 
and III (2) of the INF Treaty state that "each Party shall eliminate its . . . shorter-range 
missiles, [and] not have such systems thereafter," and that "for the purposes of the 
Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are: . . . for the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as 
the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively."
These two weapons systems, introduced at the beginning of the 1980s, cannot be 
regarded as inconsequential. The SS23 (NATO designation Spider) has a radius of 
action of well over 300 (statute) miles, a CEP of one-fifth of a mile, and can carry a 100-
kiloton warhead; better yet, the SS-12 (NATO designation Scaleboard) has a radius of 
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action of almost 600 miles, a CEP of one-sixth of a mile, and can carry a warhead of 
one megaton. In both cases, a nuclear or chemical warhead could be used.
Article V (2) requires that "[N]o later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, 
each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and 
deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall 
retain them at those locations until they are eliminated ...."
The revelations by the East European governments concerned indicate that the Soviet 
Union actually had transferred a significant number of the SS-23 to its (then-) Warsaw 
Pact allies instead of eliminating these missiles. These reports have not been denied 
and the only issue that has arisen concerns the date of transfer, i.e., did these actions 
occur before or after the treaty was signed, which amounts only to establishing whether 
its was a breach of the spirit or of the letter of the agreement.
More ominous still are the implications of news that reached the US administration in 
November of this year: According to a European diplomat, a Soviet military attaché in 
Baghdad had revealed the transfer to Iraq of Soviet SS- 12 missiles. The administration 
asked Moscow whether this action had occurred recently, i.e., after the conclusion of the 
lNF Treaty.
One has to assume that the answer would be positive. Hostilities in the Iran-Iraq war 
ceased eight months after the treaty came into effect and it seems very unlikely that the 
Iraqis would have failed to use the missile had it been in their possession at that time.
Moreover, the revelation may throw new light upon Moscow's prolonged reluctance to 
make Saddam Hussein agree to the withdrawal of several hundred Soviet military 
technicians from Iraq--on the grounds that they had to serve out the remainder of their 
contractual obligations (which had been superseded, one might have thought, by the 
many UN Security Council resolutions imposing an embargo on Iraq).
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If Iraq was attempting to deploy newly acquired, sophisticated SS-12 missiles (more 
modern and accurate than the obsolescent Soviet Scud in Baghdad's possession), the 
participation of Soviet military personnel would be essential. This aspect may explain 
also why Mr. Gorbachev dragged his feet for some time over UN endorsement of 
potential US military action against Iraq(which might lead Saddam Hussein to fire these 
sophisticated Soviet missiles, with consequent heavy American casualties).
The revelations concerning Soviet transfer of SS-23 and SS- 12 are particularly 
embarrassing in light of fact that the president as recently as February 23 informed the 
Congress (in the annual report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control 
Agreements) that "As of November 30, 1989, the USSR has eliminated all 957 of its 
shorter-range missiles and all 238 of its launchers for such missiles." [emphases added]
The CFE Agreement
While these reports have ominous implications for the full and genuine implementation 
of the 1987 INF Treaty, other data cast similar doubt on the fulfillment of the terms of the 
just-signed CFE agreement. According to its provisions, NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
each were to be limited to 20,000 artillery pieces, of which US forces (in Europe) and 
Soviet forces (west of the Urals) were to have no more than 13,700 each. In mid-1988, 
when the outlines of the agreement were emerging, Soviet forces (west of the Urals) 
reportedly had approximately 42,300 artillery pieces (so that about 28,600 of these 
would have had to be eliminated).
By mid-1990, the total of Soviet artillery pieces in Europe had been reduced to 33,000, 
by the simple mechanism of transferring some 9,300 east of the Urals, mostly the 
newest and most sophisticated models. Moreover, even among the units remaining 
west of the Urals, antiquated models reportedly were substituted for the more modem. 
Thus, by mid-1990, the Soviet Union would have had to eliminate only 19,300 (older) 
artillery pieces, in place of the 28,600 anticipated in 1988.
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However, in the rush to conclude CFE by the arbitrary deadline of November 19, 1990, 
the United States apparently allowed further attrition in the amount of Soviet weapons to 
be eliminated. (The November deadline, moreover, left insufficient time for agreement 
on the number of troops each side could retain).
According to the London Economist and Reuters, by mid-October of 1990, the USSR 
informed the United States that the number of Soviet artillery pieces remaining west of 
Urals was down to a mere 18,300 (implying that an additional 14,700 units had been 
moved east of the Urals in less than four months of 1990). By the time the agreement 
was signed one month later, the USSR told the US that only 13,828 artillery pieces 
remained in the area in which 13,700 were permitted, meaning that a mere 128 pieces 
were "declared" for elimination. In other words, between mid-October and mid-
November, yet another 4,472 Soviet artillery pieces had been shifted east of the Urals.
Apparently, the rapid movement of such large quantities of hardware across the Urals 
presents no major logistical problem for the USSR. (It should be noted that the parties 
have 90 days in which to verify the precise numbers; according to some reports, 
Moscow is willing to discuss increasing the number of pieces to be eliminated from 128 
to all of 600! However, the issue here is not the balance of forces but rather the 
apparent Soviet manipulation of the data.)
According to the information provided by the USSR at the time of signature, a total of 
almost 28,500 Soviet artillery pieces (over 67%) must have been moved east of the 
Urals since 1988, and the number to be destroyed has been reduced from 28,600 to 
128. This may explain also why the Soviet Union allowed fewer than 1,000 military 
facilities to be visited for verification under CFE, well under one-half of the number 
anticipated by the US.
Although only artillery is discussed in this article, it constitutes merely one factor in a 
syndrome affecting other weapon systems covered by the agreement. General Vigleik 
Eide, chairman of NATO's military committee, has stated that the Soviet Union has 
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removed some 60,000 tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces from the area west 
of the Urals and that this number exceeded by far anything that had been expected by 
NATO officials.
These NATO statistics indicate that, in addition to the 28,500 Soviet artillery pieces, 
31,500 Soviet tanks and armored vehicles have also been spirited out of the CFE 
region. (According to unofficial sources, the number was even larger: 21,000 tanks and 
28,000 armored personnel carriers.) Where the elimination of weapons numbering 
many tens of thousands had been anticipated, harsh reality shows that a mere handful 
will be destroyed.
Incidentally, while both the USSR and the US are permitted to keep conventional 
armaments outside "Europe," for the former this means merely moving major elements 
back across the Ural hills into a potential theater of combat, while the US would have to 
ship weapons across the ocean, with all the delays and complexities that have become 
apparent during the build-up in the Gulf.
Questions to Pose
Now, two questions arise in connection with these manipulations of both arms control 
agreements: Are they or are they not of major military significance? Is Gorbachev or 
some other (presumably military) element in the leadership responsible?
A quick answer to the first question would be that at least a transfer of the SS-12 to Iraq 
would be of considerable military importance, while the significance of the transfer of the 
SS-23 to East European countries, viewed ex post facto, was vitiated by subsequent 
political developments. The issue of the movement of artillery pieces across the Urals 
can be judged only by the logistical criteria to which this article has alluded. Obviously, if 
the bottom line is a net military gain of considerable dimensions for the USSR, then the 
question of threat perceptions would have to be reexamined.
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However, even if none of these manipulations pose a major military hazard for the west, 
the question arises why the USSR would risk potential diplomatic exposure and 
international disillusionment with the arms control process for gains that do not provide 
important military advantages.
As to the problem whether Gorbachev or other elements in the Soviet leadership should 
be viewed as responsible, the effect would be the same, whatever the answer. If he is 
responsible, then one would have to ask whether Gorbachev can be viewed as a 
productive partner, at this stage, for meaningful arms control measures. If someone else 
is responsible, then one would have to ask the identical question.
It is because the details of Soviet actions regarding INF and CFE raise such broader 
issues that they are worthy of discussion. It may be argued that these concerns are 
marginal at a time when dire predictions abound regarding the imminent dissolution of 
the Soviet state. However, paraphrasing a recent statement by JCS chairman General 
Colin Powell, the only worthwhile assumption about the next 18 months is that they will 
prove no less revolutionary than the previous 18 months. Wisely, he forbore from saying 
whether the movement would be forward or backward. It is because of such uncertainty 
that it would be rash to write off the concerns that are voiced in this article.
Soviet Artillery West of the Urals
! ! !  mid-1988!  mid-1990! Oct.1990! Nov. 1990
Actually present!  42,300!  33,000! 18,300! 13,828
CFE Treaty limit!  13,700!  13,700! 13,700! 13,700
To be eliminated!  28,600!  19,300!  4,600! ! 128
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